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We present a general equilibrium analysis of biofuel subsidies in an open-economy context.  In 
the small-country case, when a Pigouvian tax on conventional fuels such as crude is in place, the 
optimal biofuel subsidy is zero.  When the tax on crude is not available as a policy option, 
however, a second-best biofuel subsidy (or tax) is optimal.  In the large-country case, the optimal 
tax on crude departs from its standard Pigouvian level and a biofuel subsidy is optimal.  A 
biofuel subsidy spurs global demand for food and confers a terms-of-trade benefit to the food-
exporting nation.  This might encourage the food-exporting nation to use a subsidy even if it 
raises global crude use.  The food importer has no such incentive for subsidization.  Terms-of-
trade effects wash out between trading nations; hence, any policy intervention by the two trading 
nations that raises crude use must be jointly suboptimal.   
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1. Introduction 
The literature on trade and the environment has proceeded largely along two paths.  One 
strand of the literature has examined the impact of trade itself on pollution (see Copeland and 
Taylor, 1994, 2003).  It has highlighted the fact that by fostering economic growth, trade can 
have two opposing effects on environmental quality.  On the one hand, the higher output 
resulting from trade would contribute to pollution (the “scale” effect).
1  On the other hand, 
higher income would result in greater demand for a cleaner environment and might, therefore, 
result in the adoption of pollution-reducing technologies (the “technique” effect).
2,3  A second 
strand of the literature has modeled strategic interactions between two trading partners.  An 
important conclusion drawn by this line of inquiry is that, contrary to popular wisdom, it might 
not be optimal for a government to impose weak environmental standards on domestic industries 
to give them a competitive advantage.  Strict standards might instead be optimal if firms compete 
in prices (Barrett, 1994).  It has also been argued that the choice between a tax on the origin of a 
polluting good and a tax on its destination is not clear because each could be optimum under 
certain circumstances (Cremer and Gahvari, 2006). 
There is a gap in the trade and environment literature in that it does not account for the 
policy challenges presented by the use of biofuels, especially bioethanol, as an integral part of 
the strategy to meet new emission standards.
4  Policies to promote the use of biofuels cannot be 
discussed in isolation from two related issues.  First, it is generally accepted that the growth of 
                                                 
1 If, however, pollution quotas are enforced through the issuance of a fixed number of pollution permits, the 
environmental impact of trade liberalization might be negligible.  Further, it can be shown that if pollution taxes are 
adjusted to equate the marginal cost of pollution with the marginal benefits of the associated production, the net 
impact on pollution is indeterminate (Lopez, 1994; Rauscher, 1997; Copeland and Taylor, 2003).  
2 Empirical evidence suggests that the effects of rising income might be the stronger driver of the trade-environment 
relationship, resulting in a positive impact of trade on environment in higher-income countries (Frankel and Rose, 
2005). 
3 See Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001). 
4 The European Union (EU) has set a goal of 5.75% of motor fuel use by 2010, and 10% by 2020.  The United States 
has mandated the use of about 28 billion liters of biofuels for transportation by 2012.  Brazil has a target of 5% 
biodiesel use in all diesel by 2013.  In India, 9 states requires a 5% ethanol blend in all gasoline, and, in China, 5 
provinces require a 10% blend. (Sources: von Braun and Pachauri, 2005; Ernst & Young, 2007)  2
the biofuel industry in all countries except Brazil, where it has attained scale economies, is 
contingent on significant subsidy.
5  Such subsidies, in turn, can be the basis for trade wars as 
countries impose tariffs on imports of subsidized biofuels from other nations.
6  Second, given the 
energy inefficiency of biofuels, an aggressive strategy to promote the use of biofuels can divert 
food from direct consumption and lead to a significant increase in the world prices of food 
items.
7  For example, according to von Braun and Pachauri (2006), without significant 
improvements in agricultural productivity, by 2020 the prices of cassava, a staple food in African 
countries, would rise by as much as 135%.
8 Developed countries would be affected also if, as 
projected, there is a steep increase in the prices of staple items like corn (41%) and wheat (30%).  
Such projections clearly warrant a discussion about the efficacy of opting for biofuel subsidies.
9 
We contribute to the literature by taking into consideration those issues that are 
conventionally addressed by researchers examining the trade and environment relationship, as 
well as those issues that are relevant for biofuel policy.  In our model, the utility of representative 
consumers depend on environmental quality, among other things.  In addition, we assume that 
energy production requires the use of both fossil fuel and biofuel, and that the alternative use of 
                                                 
5 In the U.S., where bioethanol production is corn based, the break-even price for petroleum is $54 per barrel, and in 
Europe, where bioethanol production is wheat based, the break-even price is $72 per barrel (Larson, 2008).  The U.S. 
government provides a subsidy of 51 cents per gallon to producers of bioethanol.  In Germany, where the growth of 
the production and use of biofuels was among the fastest in EU member countries, biofuel producers not only enjoy 
a 35% tax advantage vis-a-vis the producers of traditional fuels, but the state also subsidizes construction of biofuel 
production units up to 50%.  Not to be left behind, the Australian government has waived the excise duty on fuel 
production for producers of bioethanol until 2011. 
6 The EU imposed 5-year tariffs on US biodiesel to counter American subsidies and dumping (Bloomberg, 7 July 
2009).  The tariff is €237 per metric ton to counter American subsidies and €198 per metric ton to counter dumping.  
This translates into a tariff rate of about 41%.  Ironically, in 2007, the United States itself had imposed a tariff of 54 
cents per gallon on imports of Brazilian bioethanol, resulting in a trade dispute that has not been resolved yet.   
7  For example, corn-based ethanol has 57% energy efficiency while petroleum has 81% efficiency. OECD (2006) 
estimates suggest that, to account for 10% of vehicular fuel, 60-70% of the current crop area in the U.S., Canada, 
and the EU-15 countries would have to be devoted to crops that can be used to produce ethanol. 
8 Runge and Senauer (2007) have argued that by pushing up the price of crops that are staples for the world’s poor 
population, by 2025 biofuels could nearly double the number of people who are chronically hungry. 
9 By contrast, the discussion in the trade and environment literature largely involves policies that either cap pollution 
through fiat and permits or raise the cost of producing the polluting good (see Copeland and Taylor, 2004, for a 
discussion).  3
the food product used to produce biofuel is direct consumption.  This enables us to capture the 
impact of policy on food prices, and to compare the impact of subsidizing the use of biofuel with 
that of taxing the use of fossil fuel.  Our model illuminates the debate about the relative efficacy 
of conventional pollution taxes and biofuel subsidies along the lines of similar debates in the 
public economics literature (see Ballard and Medema, 1993; Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001).  
We show first that in the small open-economy case, the optimal policies are a Pigouvian 
tax on crude and a zero subsidy on biofuel.  If, on the other hand, the option of crude taxation is 
not available, a biofuel subsidy (or tax) might be the second-best policy.  A subsidy encourages 
energy producers to reduce crude use by substituting biofuel as an input, conferring 
environmental benefits.  On the other hand, the subsidy tends to reduce the price of energy and 
spurs its demand.  If this second effect is strong, a tax rather than a subsidy may be welfare 
augmenting.  We extend the analysis to consider two large open economies that trade food (the 
source of biofuel) and a manufactured good.  In contrast to the small-country case, terms-of-trade 
considerations make it optimal for the food-exporting nation to use a biofuel subsidy (or tax) 
even if an optimal tax on crude is in place.
10  Finally, we consider a Nash game in biofuel 
subsidies between the trading nations.  We find that terms-of-trade considerations may lead to a 
jointly suboptimal Nash policy equilibrium that is associated with too much pollution. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the small open-
economy model.  Section 3 considers the large-country case, where the change in the terms-of-
trade for food plays a central role.  Section 4 concludes. 
                                                 
10 We assume throughout the paper that nations do not use trade taxes like an export tax or an import tariff.  There 
are two reasons for this assumption.  The first is that we want to focus on the terms-of-trade effects of biofuel 
subsidies, which, as explained above, are being increasingly used in different nations.  The second reason is that an 
explicit trade policy to improve terms of trade is inconsistent with the multilateral trade liberalization process.  A 
biofuel subsidy to domestic producers of energy, however, does not conflict with WTO rules guiding trade policies.       4
2. The Base Case: A Small Open Economy 
Let us consider a small open economy with representative consumers.  Each consumer 
maximizes utility given by  ( , , , ) UU F E M G   , whereF  , E  , M  , and G are consumption levels 
of food, energy, a manufactured good, and clean environment, respectively.  M is the numeraire 
good.  If p is the price of food and q is the price of energy, the expenditure function is 
) , , 1 , , ( G u q p e  Min  ,
~ ~ ~
M E q F p   subject to  ( , , , ) uU F E M G   ,    (1) 
which yields the usual Hicksian demand functions.  In addition,  0  u e
11 and  0    G u G U e e .
12    
In this economy, all commodities are produced using constant returns to scale (CRS).   
Food (F) is produced using labor (
F L ) and land (T ).  Assuming that land is specific to food and 
that its endowment is given, we have 
(, ) () ,
FF FF L T f L   where  (.) 0 f    and  (.) 0 f   .         (2) 
Competitive profit maximization ensures that  (.) ' pf w  , implying that  ( , )
FF LL p w  .   
Similarly, the manufactured good is produced using labor (
M L ) and energy (
M E ): 
(, )
MM M ML E  .             ( 3 )  
The profit maximization conditions are  ) , (
M M
L E L M w  and ) , (
M M
E E L M q  .  Labor supply is 
given at L , such that 
FM LL L  .              ( 4 )  
Finally, energy is produced using food for biofuel (B) and crude oil (R) – our proxy for fossil 
fuel.  All of R is assumed to be imported at a given price r: 
                                                 
11 Throughout the paper we use the convention that unless specified otherwise,  i  and  ij   are, respectively, the first- 
and second-order partial derivatives of any function  (, ) ij x x  .   
12 Consider quasi-linear preferences and separability of G:  (,) () UF E MG      .  The expenditure function 
associated with this utility function is:   (,,, ) (,) (,) [(,) ,(,) ] G epq u G p Fpq q Epq u FpqEpq         , which 
implies  (,) p eF p q   ,  (,) E q ep q   ,  1 u e  ,  () 0 G eG    , and  0 pu qu ee     5
) R , B ( E E  .            ( 5 )  
The corresponding profit maximization conditions equate the net input prices to the values of 
their marginal products.   
 
2.1  Optimal Subsidy on Biofuel and an Optimal Tax on Crude 
  The government subsidizes the use of biofuel (B) such that its input price in energy 
production, net of subsidy s, is  s p p
s   .  Also, the government uses a tax t on crude, so the 
domestic price of crude is  t r r
d   .  Finally, we assume that although all activities are 
potentially polluting, the damage to the environment is larger when crude oil is used to produce 
energy.   Further, noting that in the small country case crude used by the rest of the world (
* R ) is 
given for the domestic nation, we model clean environment as a decreasing function of the 
amount of crude used in this economy
13  
() GG R  ,  () 0 GR   .            ( 6 )  
The obvious policy implication is that if the government wants to improve environmental quality, 
it would have to reduce the use of crude in energy production, ceteris paribus.  It is also evident 
from the above discussion that the instruments available to achieve this change are the subsidy 
for biofuel and the tax on crude.    
  The expenditure-revenue identity for this economy (equivalently, its trade balance 
equation) is given by 
. ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) , , 1 , , (
M M M F qE rR pB R B qE E L M L pf G u q p e                 (7) 
Given the difficulties in trading energy over long distances in its final form, we assume that E is 
a nontraded good, with its price determined by the zero profit condition: 
                                                 
13 An alternative would be to propose that G is a function of biofuel and crude, with biofuel being relatively less 
polluting.  To keep the model simple, we assume that while crude is polluting, biofuel is not.     6




qC p r qq s t q q
EE
     ,       ( 8 )  
where (.) C  is the unit cost of producing energy.  The assumption of CRS implies that 
tR sB rR pB qE      .  Substituting this expression in (7), and using (8), total differentiation 
of (7) yields 
dR G e t sdB du e G u ) ' (     ,          ( 9 )  
where the first term on the right-hand side is the loss due to the distortion in input use, and the 
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R  (11) 
Notice that  G eG measures the amount of the numeraire good that the consumer will need to be 
compensated for a unit rise inR (and hence pollution).  Therefore, using (10) and (11), it is clear 
that the optimal crude tax is the Pigouvian tax, which equals the marginal damage from pollution.  
Also, when this tax is in place, the optimal biofuel subsidy is zero.   
 
Proposition 1:  In a small open economy that produces energy using crude oil (which is 
polluting) and biofuel (assumed to be clean), the optimal policy is to use a Pigouvian tax on 
                                                 
14 Part B of the appendix derives  s R ,  t R ,  s B  and  t B  for both the small- and the large-country cases using a quasi-
linear utility function that is also separable in G.  This provides a tractable example, and there is no loss in generality.  
Indeed, the analysis in the text is for general utility functions.  Details of derivations for the general case, which 
allows for income effects, are available from the authors on request.    7
crude equaling its marginal damage to the environment.  The optimal biofuel subsidy is zero 
when such a tax is in place.   
The above finding is not surprising because, in a small open economy, the only source of 
market failure is the environmental externality of crude production.  An appropriate tax is 
enough to rectify this failure, and no other instrument is necessary.
15  This is a useful benchmark 
for the analysis and results below, where we extend the model to consider situations where either 
a tax is not available as an instrument or other externalities exist (such as a terms-of-trade 
externality) that the tax instrument cannot address fully.     
   
2.2  Second-Best Biofuel Subsidy (when a crude tax is not feasible) 
  In certain nations and in certain situations, a tax on crude might not be available as a 
policy instrument, perhaps because of the country’s political economy.
16  On the other hand, the 
presence of a strong agricultural lobby can make biofuels attract policy attention.  Consider 
ethanol produced from corn, which is mixed with crude to make the final fuel.  Although the 
efficiency of making corn-based ethanol is questionable, it is quite popular in the United States 
because it is good for the corn farmers and draws support from the agricultural lobby.  The 
analysis below describes the biofuel subsidy as a second-best instrument. 














  ,          ( 1 2 )  
                                                 
15 This result is consistent with that of Ballard and Medema (1993), who found that a Pigouvian tax on pollution 
might have better implications for welfare than a subsidy toward abatement cost.  On the other hand, Fullerton and 
Metcalf (2001) posit that taxes and subsidies (and indeed command and control policies) might have equivalent 
welfare effects.  However, their results were driven by the construct that allowed for reductions of labor market 
distortions through corresponding reductions in income tax rates, the latter facilitated by the revenue raised through 
pollution taxes. 
16 We do not pursue an explicit political economy analysis in this paper.  It is possible to do that in future work 
along the lines of Fredriksson (1997), among others.   8
where 
SB s  is the second-best biofuel subsidy.  Note that 
(.) (.) (.) . s rr rp R CEd R Cd E E C d s             ( 1 3 )  
Also, total energy use must equal the amount used as an input in the manufacturing sector plus 
the amount used directly in consumption: 
  ,() , 1 ,, () (,)
M
q E ep q s u G R E p q 
17  
M
qq q qu qG dE e E dq e du e G dR      . (14) 
Using (13) and (14), 
     s
M
qq q s qG qu rp dE e E q EC e G ds e du      

, where,    11 . rq G CGe     (15) 
Using (8), note that when  0 t  ,  ) (s q q   and  . 0    E B qs  Using this fact, along with (13) 
and (15), we have  
, Ydu ds Z Aq dR s                            (16) 
where  () 0
M
qq q r Ae E C    , 0 s rp ZE C    , and  qu r Ye C   .
18,19  At the utility-maximizing 
, s   0 du   and 
    . ss R Aq Z                                                                                                                 (17) 
  Following a similar set of steps as above, we can compute the impact on food demand of 
a biofuel subsidy: 
  , du Y ds Z q A dB
F F
s
F                            (18) 
where  () 0 s
FM
qq q p AC e E    , ( ) 0 ss s s
F
qG rp p p p ZE C e G C C      ,
20 and  s p qu
F C e Y   .  Once 
again, at the utility-maximizing subsidy rate,  0 du   and  
                                                 
17 The zero profit condition in manufacturing is  (,, 1 ) 1
MM Cw q p   .  This implies that  () ww q  and that 
()
M M Ew q L   .   Using (2) and (4),    ,( ) (,)
MM M LL p w qL p q  .  Thus,  (,)
MM EE p q  . 
18 It can be shown that A < 0 if  < 0, which is the case when    Gq u qu G qG U e e U e     is small. 
19 Note that in the two-input case, concavity of the cost function requires that the cross effect is strictly positive.  9
0.
FF
ss BA qZ                             (19) 
Using (17) and (19) in (12) (i.e., after taking into account the impact of the subsidy on the use of 








   

 iff  0 ss Aq Z R   .       ( 2 0 )  
 
Proposition 2:  In the absence of a tax on crude, the second-best policy is to subsidize the use of 
biofuel if and only if the cross input substitution effect in energy production overcomes the 
subsidy’s scale effect via a reduction in the price of energy.     
 
The term s Aq captures the scale effect of the subsidy on crude demand, while Z  is the 
cross-substitution effect between the two inputs in energy production.  The latter effect is easy to 
understand.  The biofuel subsidy reduces the relative price of biofuel, thereby providing an 
incentive to substitute biofuel for crude in the production of energy.  Its magnitude depends on 
the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs.  Consider now the scale effect.  The subsidy 
reduces the net input price of biofuel.  This is passed on as a reduction in energy price, which 
stimulates the aggregate demand for energy, which in turn raises production (the scale effect).  
The net impact of these two effects is ex ante ambiguous and is determined by demand-side 
parameters and the aforementioned elasticity of substitution.  If technology is Leontief type, for 
example, the cross-substitution effect will disappear altogether.  In such a case, the demand for 
crude would unambiguously increase with a subsidy, and a government that aims to improve 
environmental quality should tax biofuel rather than subsidize it.  On the other hand, the demand 
for food as an input in energy production would rise because of the own-price substitution effect 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 We assume here that the environment-generated income effect on energy demand (i.e., eqG ) is sufficiently small, 
such that the own-price effect  s s pp C  dominates.  10
– as energy producers substitute biofuel for crude – and the scale effect that increases the 
demand for energy itself.
21 
  The proposition highlights the fact that biofuel subsidies might not be innocuous.  Just as 
economic growth associated with trade has a “scale” effect that might increase pollution, 
subsidization of biofuels might increase pollution by increasing the demand for energy.  Notice, 
however, that in our model, the rise in the demand for energy is not from a pure income effect.  
Rather, it is a consequence of a price effect that spurs energy demand. 
 
3. The Large-Country Case 
The small-country assumption retained up to this point requires that the price for food 
(i.e., p) is given exogenously by the world market.  An important issue regarding biofuel 
subsidies is that they encourage alternate uses of food products, thus reducing the net availability 
of food and raising its price in the global market.  This issue can be modeled in the context of a 
large open economy where the food price is endogenous.  If the subsidy raises the net global 
demand for food, its international price will rise, conferring terms-of-trade gains to the food-
exporting nation.  In addition, following the logic of the previous sections, such a subsidy will 
also affect pollution.   
  Suppose that there are three nations: home, foreign, and the rest of the world (ROW).    
The home country exports food to the foreign country and imports a manufactured good from it.  
It also imports crude from the ROW at a given terms of trade r and pays in terms of the 
manufactured good (the numeraire).  Thus, the home trade balance requires that the value of its 
food exports must equal the value of its net imports of the manufactured good.  The latter equals 
the sum of home consumption of the manufactured good and its payment to the ROW for crude, 
                                                 
21 One would, of course, also have to consider the impact of the resultant change in environmental quality on energy 
demand, but it would be reasonable to assume that this effect would be of second-order importance and would be 
dominated by the own-price substitution effect.  11
net of home production of the manufactured good.  Analogously, the foreign country’s net export 
of the manufactured good equals its production minus the sum of its consumption demand and 
payment to the ROW (for crude).  Finally, the ROW is assumed to not have any domestic 
consumption of crude, and its only role in the model is to provide crude to the home and foreign 
countries in exchange for the manufactured good.
22  Home and foreign trade balance conditions 
are, respectively, 
M rR M pX   
~
 and  ,
~ * * * * M rR M pX            ( 2 1 )    
where  B e f X p     and 
* * * * B e f X p     are their net exports of food.
23 
 
3.1  Optimal Policy: The One-Sided Case 
  This subsection considers optimal policy choice for the home nation, where the foreign 
nation is passive (i.e., when 
** 0 st  ).  In the presence of a home tax t on crude and a subsidy 
s on biofuel, the home expenditure-revenue relationship is 
. ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) , , 1 , , (
M M M F qE rR pB R B qE E L M L pf G u q p e           ( 2 2 )    
Noting that in the large-country case 
* R is endogenous, (6) has to be replaced by 
* () GG RR  .  
We differentiate (22) to get  
. ' ) ' (
* dR G e dR G e t sdB Xdp du e G G u             ( 2 3 )    
Equation (23) is similar to (9) in the small open-economy case, with two important differences.  
The first is the terms-of-trade effect, which is captured by the first term on the right-hand-side of 
(23).  Home’s utility will rise to the tune of a rise in the price of food (i.e., dp) weighted by its 
                                                 
22 This structure lends tractability to the model.  Admittedly, allowing for price of crude to be endogenous and for 
the ROW to consume crude are realistic assumptions, but they come at the cost of complicating an already-complex 
analysis.  The central points that we make are intuitive and can be made without adding to the model’s complexity.  
23 Note that production and consumption structure in both nations are the same as in section 2. The notation is 
similar, except that an asterisk refers to the foreign country.  12
level of food export (i.e., X).  The second critical difference (compared with the small-country 
case) is that when the home country affects p, it affects the foreign country’s net input price of 
biofuel as well.  In turn, this changes 
* R , and hence G .  Given that the foreign government is 
assumed to be passive,  
** * *'
W
uG e du X dp e G dR  and 
* R R R
W   ,        ( 2 4 )  
where 
W R is global crude use.
24  The market-clearing equation for food is 
, 0
* * * *         X X B e B e f f p p          ( 2 5 )  
which implies that 
) , ( t s p p  .
25               ( 2 6 )  
Using (23) and (26), the optimal subsidy and tax levels are 

** '( ) s Gs tG t t s opt
st st










opt tG t t
G
t




 .        (27b) 
       
Proposition 3:  A large open-economy’s optimal tax on crude will depart from the standard 
Pigouvian tax of the small open-economy case.  Also, even if an optimal tax on crude is in place, 
the optimal biofuel subsidy may be nonzero.   
 
   It is clear from an inspection of (27a) and (27b) that even if an optimal crude tax is in 
place, a biofuel subsidy is still required.  Consider for expositional purposes the case where  S R is 
                                                 
24 We relax this passivity assumption in the next subsection, where both nations may use biofuel subsidies.   
25 The terms-of-trade effects are analyzed by using a quasi-linear utility function that is also separable in G .  This 
serves as a tractable example and does not compromise the generality of our results.  13
zero and s p is positive.  In this case, assuming that  s B  is positive,
26 the optimal subsidy is 
positive if and only if the term  s Xp  is larger than 
*
Gs eG R  .  The term  s Xp  is the standard terms-of 
trade effect, while 
*
Gs eG R  is home’s utility loss from increased crude use (and pollution) by the 
foreign country, induced by a rise in the price of food (and hence the price of biofuel) due to 
home’s subsidization.  These two effects are novel to the large-country case and explain why the 
optimal biofuel subsidy here departs from the zero level of the small-country case discussed in 
proposition 1.  In the small-country case, the only role of the biofuel subsidy is to target the 
domestic crude level (R ).  When an optimal crude tax is in place, there is no reason to use the 
subsidy.  This is not true in the large-country case.  Even if the effect of a biofuel subsidy on 
domestic crude use is zero (i.e., if  0 s R  ), there are still gains from using a biofuel subsidy.    
 Turning to the optimal tax on crude, it is clear from (27b) that the expression for the 
optimal tax here is different from  ' G eG  (which was the optimal tax level in the small-country 
case).  The expression differs because the tax here has three additional effects.  First, it affects 
the use of biofuel and therefore the burden of the subsidy to the extent 
. opt
t B s .  Second, by 
changing p, the price of crude relative to the net input price of 
* B is affected in the foreign nation.  
If this leads to an increase in foreign crude use (i.e., if 
* 0 t R  ), then home utility is reduced.  
Finally, if the tax raises the price of food (i.e., if  0 t p  ), then the home nation gains to the tune 
of  t Xp .
27   
                                                 
26 In the appendix we show that while  s B is necessarily positive in the small-country case, there is some ambiguity 
in the current context.  The conditions under which  s B is positive is outlined on pages 21 and 22 in the appendix.   
27 The expression for pt is in the appendix.  Suffice it to note here that a tax affects the net global demand for food 
through various channels, including the substitution of biofuel for crude in energy production when crude becomes 
more expensive.  This effect by itself will tend to raise demand and the price of food, but there are countervailing 
effects.  For example, the tax raises the input price for energy production, in turn raising the energy price.  This will 
tend to reduce energy demand, which will reduce the derived demand for biofuel.  For details, we refer the reader to 
the appendix.  14
3.2  Nash Biofuel Subsidies 
  Here we consider a scenario in which a crude tax is unavailable as a policy instrument, 
although home and foreign can both use biofuel subsidies.
28  Each nation’s subsidy affects the 
net global demand for food and, hence the common international price of food.  Therefore, each 
country’s biofuel subsidy affects the other’s utility, raising strategic considerations for both 
nations.  We assume that the nations play Nash in the sense that each takes the other’s subsidy 
rate as given when choosing its own utility-maximizing subsidy.  The market-clearing equation 
(25) yields 
) , (
* s s p p  .            ( 2 8 )  
Using (22) and (28), 
. '
W
s G s s s u R G e sB Xp u e             ( 2 9 )  












 , iff  '
W
s Gs Xpe G R  .         ( 3 0 a )  
Analogously, we can derive the foreign subsidy rule.  In addition, using


















s Gs Xpe G R          (30b) 
The details of the terms-of-trade effects ( s p  and  * s p ) are analyzed in the appendix.  
Suffice it to say here that one of the primary effects of a biofuel subsidy is to encourage the use 
of biofuel instead of crude.  This increases the demand for food (as biofuel) and raises its price 
regardless of which country is providing the subsidy.  Thus, both  s p and  * s p  are likely to be 
                                                 
28 This assumption lends tractability and allows us to focus better on the role of interdependence between nations in 
their choice of biofuel subsidies.  This is a relatively small sacrifice to make, because the fundamental insights of 
using a crude tax and biofuel subsidy combination have already been discussed.           15
positive.  On the other hand, there is an asymmetry in the terms-of-trade effect on the utility of 
the two nations, because while home is an exporter of food (i.e., X > 0), foreign is an importer 
(i.e.,
* 0 XX   ).  First, consider the case where 
W
s R is negative.  Home subsidization reduces 
global pollution, and this benefit, coupled with the terms-of-trade gain, suggests that the Nash 
subsidy in (30a) is positive.  On the other hand, if the scale effect makes 
W
s R  positive, the terms-
of-trade motive and the pollution-reduction motive conflict and a subsidy might or might not be 
justified.  Using (30b) we can see that analogous considerations suggest that the foreign country, 
which suffers from a terms-of-trade loss when it uses a biofuel subsidy, will subsidize only if its 
subsidy reduces pollution (i.e., only if  * 0
W
s R  ).  The foreign country will choose a subsidy if the 
aforementioned necessary condition is met, and if the pollution reduction effect dominates the 
adverse terms-of-trade effect that the foreign nation imposes on itself. 
  It is easy to see from the discussion above that terms-of-trade considerations might lead 
the home country to choose a biofuel subsidy even when it increases pollution, and conversely, 
the foreign country may choose a tax even when its subsidy reduces pollution.  It is obvious that 
such an equilibrium is jointly suboptimal: the terms-of-trade effects wash out between the two 
nations while the pollution increase reduces joint welfare.  This is explained below by adapting 
equation (23) to the current context: 
  *
** * * * * () () ' .
W
uG G u e du e du X X dp sdB s dB e e G dR         (31a) 
Note that market clearing for food requires that  0
*   X X .  Thus, (31a) simplifies to 
*
** * * * () ' .
W
uG G u e du e du sdB s dB e e G dR            (31b) 
Evaluating (31b) at the nonintervention outcome ( 0
*   s s ) , and normalizing marginal utility 
of income for both nations to unity at this outcome  
**
*0 () ( )
W
GG ss du u e e G d R      .         ( 3 2 )   16
It is clear that joint utility can rise only starting from nonintervention if global crude use falls, 
leading to less pollution.  Therefore, any policy intervention by either nation that leads to a net 
rise in crude use is jointly suboptimal.       
 
Proposition 4:  The exporter of food might impose a biofuel subsidy because of the terms-of-
trade motive, even if doing so leads to increased global crude use (and pollution).  In contrast, 
the food-importing nation has an incentive to tax biofuel even when doing so raises pollution.  
Unless the gains from pollution reduction dominate, the food importer will not subsidize.  Such a 
Nash equilibrium is jointly suboptimal and is better than nonintervention only if it leads to 
reduced crude use and, hence, less pollution. 
 
  It is clear from proposition 4 that the Nash subsidy equilibrium may be associated with 
too much pollution relative to nonintervention.  This is necessarily the case when  0
W
s R  , 
* 0
W
s R  , and terms-of-trade motives dominate for both nations, so that home imposes a biofuel 
subsidy while the foreign nation imposes a biofuel tax.  Because  0
W
s R   and  * 0
W
s R   in this case, 
the home subsidy and the foreign tax both raise pollution.  Clearly then, the Nash equilibrium is 
worse than the nonintervention outcome.  The welfare ranking of other possible cases is not 
obvious, and one has to proceed on a case-by-case basis.     
 
4.  Conclusion 
  This paper provides an analysis of policy aimed at boosting the use of clean fuels.  The 
small open-economy case highlights the fact that if Pigouvian taxes are available, a biofuel 
subsidy is not necessary to combat pollution.  If a tax on crude is not available, a biofuel subsidy 
still might not be welfare augmenting because of conflicting substitution and scale effects.   17
Under certain situations, therefore, the second-best policy is not to subsidize biofuels but to tax 
them.   
  In contrast with the small-country case, the large-country analysis shows that even if a 
tax on crude is in place, a food-exporting nation might gain from a biofuel subsidy because of 
terms-of-trade gains.  Also, because of these considerations, the optimal tax on crude departs 
from its standard Pigouvian level.   
  Finally, we considered the use of biofuel subsidies by the food-exporting and food-
importing nations.  The two countries’ policies are interdependent in the large-country case 
because they affect the common international terms of trade for food.  The Nash equilibrium that 
emerges is jointly suboptimal because unilateral Nash optimization fails to internalize the 















A.   Terms-of-Trade Effects  
  For tractability, we assume quasi-linearity of preferences and separability of G for this 
appendix.  These assumptions allow us to abstract from income effects, considerably simplifying 
the discussion, without changing the thrust of our analysis.  The general case is available on 










  ,           ( A 1 )  
where  0
F D  , because of the Marshall-Lerner condition, and 
    (.) s ss
F
sp q q q s pp p NeCE f L q E C     .            ( A 2 )  
Noting that the concavity of the unit cost function in sector M ensures that  () wq [defined in 
footnote 17] is convex, we get   
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   

 and  (.) 0 f   .     (A4) 
Finally, 
 (, , 1 ) 0 s s p qC ps rt q C       .         ( A 5 )  
Using (A3) through (A5) in (A2), and noting that  (.) C is concave in input prices, 
    (.) 0 ss s
F
sp q q q s pp p NeCE f L q E C       if   0 pq e  .      ( A 6 )  
(A6) provides a sufficient but not necessary condition for the biofuel subsidy to raise the 
international price of food.  Indeed, even if   pq e  is positive (i.e., food and energy are Hicksian  19
substitutes in consumption), the price of food will rise unless this cross-substitution effect in 
consumption overwhelms all the other effects.   
  The primary effect of the subsidy is to raise the use of biofuel as an input into energy at 
given prices.  This is captured by the term  0 ss pp EC   .  The subsidy also reduces the price of 
energy because of a reduction in the unit cost (i.e.,  0 s q  ).  The lower energy price directly 
raises food demand if they are Hicksian complements (i.e., if  0 pq e  ).  It also boosts the demand 
for energy for consumption and as an input in manufacturing, thereby raising the demand for 
food as an input in energy production:   0 s
M
qq q s p Ce Eq   .  Finally, the lower energy input 
price expands the manufacturing sector at the expense of the food sector, driving down food 
supply:  0
F
q fL    because  0
F
q L  .  All these effects contribute to a rise in the net demand for 
food (unless  pq e  is positive and larger than the sum of the other effects), raising the price of food.  
This confers a terms-of-trade benefit to the home country as the exporter of food, and a loss to 











  ,           ( A 7 )  
where, 
    (.) s sd
F
tp q q q t pp r NeCE f L q E C     ,            ( A 8 )  
and, 




      
.          ( A 9 )  
Using equations (A3) to (A6),  20
  (.) 0 s
F
pq q q p eCEf L     if  0 pq e  .                 (A10) 
Using (A9) and (A10) in (A8), we see that while the first term on the right-hand side of (A8) is 
negative, the second term is positive.  Thus the sign of  t N  is ambiguous.  This happens for the 
following reasons.  First, the tax raises the relative price of crude as an input and increases the 
input demand for biofuel (and, therefore, for the food product) via the cross-substitution effect.  
On the other hand, the remaining effects all reduce demand for food as follows: (i)  The crude 
tax raises the price of energy, which results in reduced consumption demand for food, if food and 
energy are Hicksian complements in consumption, (ii) The rise in the price of energy reduces the 
demand for energy, resulting in a decline in the derived demand for biofuel in energy production, 
(iii)  Since  0
F
q L  , the rise in the energy price raises home’s supply of food, reducing the excess 
demand for food.  
  If, in the final analysis, the effects of the induced change in energy price are dominated 
by the primary cross-substitution effect, then  0 0 tt Np  .  The analysis for  * s p is similar to 
that for  s p  above.   
 
B.   Effects of Policy Variables on Biofuel and Crude Use  
 Noting  that  ( , ,1) Cp sr t  is the unit cost function in the energy sector, CRS ensures 
that 
 (, , 1 ) s p B EC p s r t   .            ( A 1 1 )  
Under quasi-linearity and separability in G, 
  (,)
M
q Eep q E  .           ( A 1 2 )   21
Noting that  ( ) ww q  , using  ( )
MM EL w q   from (A4), and using (2) and (4) [which yields 
(,)
MM LL p w  ], we get  
    (,) , () ()
MM M E Ep q Lp w q w q    ,          ( A 1 3 )  
where  () 0
MM
pp Ew q L    , and  0
M
q E   as shown in (A3).  
  Allowing for all the policy variables considered in this paper to be present, the market 
clearing equation for food dictates that 
 
* (,, ) p psts  .            ( A 1 4 )  
Using (A5), 
 (, , 1 ) ( , , ) qC ps rt qq p s t     ,     w h e r e         
 0 s p p qC  ,    0 s sp p qC q    , and  0 d t r qC   .      ( A 1 5 )  
Using (A12) through (A15), 
    
* ( , , ) (.), (.), , (.), (.), ,
M
q E Ests e p q p st E p q p st       ,  
 where 
* (.) ( , , ) p psts  .            ( A 1 6 )  
Using (A11) and (A16), 
 
** ( , ,) ( , ,) ( ( . ) , , 1 ) s p B sts Ests C p sr t   .          ( A 1 7 )  
Using (A17) and simplifying, we get 
  () () ( 1 ) sss s
MM
s qp p s s qq q s ppp p B Ce Ep C q e E E C p       .      ( A 1 8 )  
In the small-country case, 0 s p   and (A18) reduces to 
 () 0 ss s
M
ss q q q pp p BC q e E E C    ,           ( A 1 9 )    
because of the concavity of expenditure and cost functions and because  0 s q   and  0
M
q E  from 
(A3).  22
  Using (A18), it is clear that in the large-country case, if 1 0 s p  , then 0 s B   if the last 
term on the right-hand side of (A18) dominates or if  0 qp e   and dominates the negative term 
M
p E .  
Similarly, using (A17), 
   ss s d s tt t pp pr p B EC p C CE   ,  
 where  () () () 0
MM
tq p p tq q q p t t EeE peEq p q     , if  0 t p  and 0 qp e  .    (A20) 
In the small-country case,  0 t p   and (A20) boils down to 
  sd s tt pr p B EC C E  ,  () 0
M
tq q q t EeE q   .          ( A 2 1 )  
The two terms on the right hand side of the first equality in (A21) have opposite signs.  
Therefore, the sign of  t B  is ambiguous even in the small-country case.  Using (A20) we can infer 
that the same is true in the large-country case.   
  Analogous to (A11), 
 (, , 1 ) d r R EC p s r t   .            ( A 2 2 )  
Using (A16), we can differentiate (A22) to obtain: 
   dd s d d tt t rr p r r RC EE CpC  ,           ( A 2 3 )    
where t E is defined in (A20) above.  In the small-country case, 
     () 0 dd d d d d
M
tt q q q t rr r r r r RC EE C Ce EqE C      .         (A24) 
Using (A23) and (A20) we can see that there is ambiguity in the large-country case, but  0 t R   if 
the term  0 ds t rp Cp   is sufficiently small and if  0 qp e  .  Using (A22) and (A16), 
 (1 ) dd s s ss rr p R CE E C p   ,  23
  where     
MM M
s qp p qq q p s qq q s E e E e Eqp e Eq     .      ( A 2 5 )  
In the small-country case, (A25) reduces to 
    dd s
M
sq q q s rr p RCe EqE C   .          ( A 2 6 )  
Since   0 d
M
qq q s r Ce Eq   and  0 ds rp EC  , the sign of  s R  is ambiguous even in the small-
country case. 
  Finally, consider foreign crude use 
*. R  Analogous to (A22), and noting that 
* 0 t  , 
  
** * * (, , 1 ) r R EC p s r  .           ( A 2 7 )  
Like (A16), 
      *
** ** * * * * * ( , , ) (.), (.), (.), (.),
M
q EE s t s epq ps E pq ps       ,  
 where 
* (.) ( , , ) p psts  .            ( A 2 8 )  
Thus, 
    **
* ** * ** ** ** (, , 1 ) ss s sr s r s rp rp R EC p s r EC p ZC EC p      
  where   
**
s s E Zp  ,    ** * *
** * * * * MM
pp qp qq q Z eE eE q          ( A 2 9 )  
It is clear from (A29) that in the small-country case 
* 0 s R  .  In the large-country case, the sign is 
ambiguous because 
* 0 Z   if  *
* 0
qp e  .  Similar derivations yield 
   *
** * * *
s tr t rp R ZC EC p  .            ( A 3 0 )  
Therefore, 
* 0 t R   in the small-country case, whereas its sign is ambiguous in the large-country 
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